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INTRODUCTION

From the perspective of a small, inexperienced businessperson,
default provisions governing transferability of interests in most state
limited liability company statutes' contain invisible pitfalls which

1. ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-.995
(Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West Supp. 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34100 to -242 (West Supp. 1995) (amended by 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 95-252 (West)); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (Supp. 1994) (amended by 70 Del. Laws C.75 (1995)); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109
(1994 & Supp. 1995); 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 2723(§§ 1-21); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1994
& Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-1 to /60-1 (Srnith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -12-11 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100.1601 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7652 (Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 275.001 to -.455 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-69
(West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS'NS §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, §§ 1-68
(West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West Supp. 1995); MrNN. STAT,
ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -1204 (Supp.
1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740 (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to 1307 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 86.010-.571 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1- :85 (Supp. 1995); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West Supp. 1995) (amended by 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West));
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie Supp. 1993) (amended by 1995 N.M. Laws 213); N.Y.
LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01-.58
(Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-60 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 63.001-.990 (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8901-8998 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 716-1 to -75 (1992 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to -59 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201-
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prevent full membership rights from automatically transferring2 with the
purchase of an interest in a limited liability company ("LLC").3 Because
these default provisions prevent free transferability of full membership
interests, the layman who purchases an LLC interest may not realize that,
in most states, such a transaction is basically a passive investment, which
denies the assignee any managerial powers in the LLC. Such a result
conflicts with the goals of an assignee who purchases an LLC interest as
a sole means of earning a livelihood.' In effect, default provisions of
state LLC statutes that forbid transfer of managerial rights directly to an

assignee contradicts a small businessperson's reasonable expectation of

101 to -248-606 (1995); TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1.01-11.07 (West 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-I01 to -157 (1994 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073
(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West Supp. 1995); W.
VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-I to -69 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-.1305 (West Supp. 1994)
(amended by 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 (West)); WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-102 to -144 (Supp. 1995).
Additionally, the District of Columbia has enacted an LLC statute. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 291301 to -1375 (Supp. 1995). As of September 28, 1996, LLC legislation was pending before both
houses of the Vermont legislature. H. 346, 63d Biennial Sess., 1995 Vt. Laws §§ 1-3; 5. 98, 63d
Biennial Sess., 1995 Vt. Laws §§ 1-3.
2. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW.
1, 5 (1995) (noting that some limited liability companies "may have important internal reasons
to... permit free transferability").
3. It has been suggested that election of the LLC form is most beneficial where the entity is
a "closely held, high liability enterprised (e.g. construction, mining and drilling).... These
organizations will benefit from the corporate safeguard of limited liability protection while enjoying
the favorable tax status of a partnership." CT CORPORATION SYSTEM, CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION TO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, XIII (Oct. 1, 1992) (unpaginated).
In general, LLCs have a relatively circumscribed role and purpose. The LLC entity form is
usefIl in the following enterprises which have "a small number of active investors:" entrepreneurial
businesses, family businesses, "passive investments, high technology businesses, venture capital projects, theatrical, real estate and oil and gas investments, . . . corporate joint ventures, .. . professionals (accountants, attorneys, doctors, etc.), debt offerings[,J ... structured finance transactions,
and ... foreign investors." Brian L. Schorr, The New York Limited Liability Company Lmv and
ProfessionalLimited Liability PartnershipProvisions,in FORMING AND USING LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS 1994, at 299, 301 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series, No. B-869, 1994).
See Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers
of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 21, 25 n.5 (1994).
Limited liability companies are privately-held largely because of federal tax consequenees .... A limited liability company would be taxed as a corporation if it were publicly
traded .... Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code taxes publicly-traded partnerships
as corporations.... Thus, going public would frustrate a principal purpose of forming
a limited liability company.
ld. (footnotes omitted); see id. at 34 rL26 (noting that publicly traded LLCs would lose their
partnership treatment for federal income tax purposes).
4. See generally infra part III (analogizing problems that minority shareholders confront in
close corporations to assignees of LLC interests).
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protecting her investment through daily, hands-on management of the
small business. It is rather ironic that one of the fundamental tenets that
underlies LLC law is protection of the freedom to contract,5 which is
guided by the parties' reasonable expectations. 6 Current state law which
denies free transferability violates a small businessperson's reasonable
expectations.
After the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") initially promulgated the
elements that an LLC must satisfy in order to receive a favorable
partnership classification for federal income tax purposes, states began
to enact their own LLC statutes patterned on the IRS' model.7 As a
result, states basically required non-transferability8 of LLC membership
preserving a partnership classification for federal
interests as a means of
9
purposes.
tax
income
5. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW (McKinney Supp. 1996) ("The New York Limited
Liability Company Law... affords the users 'freedom of contract' in structuring their capitalization,
management, economic rights and tax classification."). Bruce A. Rich & Cheryl Parsons-Reul,
PracticeCommentaries, N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW, at 4 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
6. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1380-81 n.10 (1995) (comparing and contrasting Cardozo's and
Posner's "comparative contributions ... to the law of contracts").
7. See infra part II.
8. Initially, the IRS required for federal income tax purposes unanimous consent from all the
remaining members in an LLC before an assignee could enjoy the rights and powers associated with
full membership. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361 ("[T]he assignee or transferee does not
become a substitute member and does not acquire all the attributes of the member's interest... unless all the remaining members approve the assignment or transfer.').
9. In summary, 44 states require unanimity while only 4 states and the District of Columbia
require a majority vote to confer full membership interest in a transfer. The following states require
unanimous approval of a transfer from the members of an LLC before an assignee becomes a full
member: ALA. CODE § 10-12-33(a)(1) (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.165(a) (Supp. 1994);
ARiz.REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-73 1(B)(2) (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-706(a) (Michie Supp.
1993); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17303(a) (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-702(1)
(West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-702(a)(1), -704(a)(1) (Supp. 1994); 70 Del. Laws
75 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608A33(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11503(1) (1994); 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 2723(§ 1-503(a)); IDAHO CODE § 53-638(1) (1994); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/30-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-6-4(a) (West
1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.903.1 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp.
1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.265(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
31, § 687(1)(B) (West Supp. 1994); MD.
ANN. § 1332(A)(1) (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-604(a)(2) (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, § 39(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1996); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450A506(1) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.313(2) (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-704(1)(b) (Supp. 1994); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.113.2 (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-706(1) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.351.1 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:48(I)(a) (Supp. 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-46(a)(l) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-33(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 57C-5-04(a) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-32(2) (1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1705.20(A)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2035(A)(2) (West Supp.
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Several months ago, the IRS unveiled a proposal to simplify entity
classification for federal income tax purposes ("Proposed Rules"). 0 In

a shift from its original ruling that required non-transferability of full
membership interests in an LLC to satisfy tax requirements," the IRS
now permits a default partnership classification of eligible entities for
federal income tax purposes. 12 As a result, non-transferability of full
membership powers may no longer be an integral element that enables
an entity to gain favorable tax treatment. This Note argues that, in effect,3
the states' default non-transferability requirements are now outmoded
and that states should amend their statutes in order to permit assignment
1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.255(1) (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8924(a) (1995); I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-16-36(a) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-706(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-21 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-218-102(b)(2)(A) (1995);
TEX. CORPS. & ASs'NS CODE ANN. § 4.07(A)(2) (West 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 25.15.260(I)(a) (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-34(c)(1) (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 183.0706(1) (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (Supp. 1995).
Assuming that Vermont passes an LLC statute that is identical to the presently pending bill,
an assignee would need unanimous consent from the remaining members in order to gain a full
membership interest upon assignment. H. 346, 63d Biennial Sess., 1995 Vt. Laws § 2-3073(a); S.
98, 63d Biennial Sess., 1995 Vt. Laws § 2-3073(a).
Before the assignee becomes a full member, she needs the support from a majority in interest
of the remaining members under the following jurisdictional statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34172(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1336(b) (Supp. 1995); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co.
LAW § 604(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-131(l) (1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1040(A) (Michie Supp. 1995). For a definition of majority in interest, see, e.g., N.Y. LTD.
LIAB. Co. LAW § 102(o) ("'Majority in interest of the members' means, unless otherwise provided
in the operating agreement, the members whose aggregate share of the current profits of the limited
liability company constitutes more than one-half of the aggregate of such shares of all members.").
Only Nebraska requires a two-thirds majority in interest vote from the members. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2621 (Supp. 1994).
10. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (1996) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 301) (proposed May 13, 1996). See generally infra part IV (describing Proposed
Rules regarding an entity's treatment for federal income tax purposes).
11. See supra note 9.
12. See infra part IV.
13.
[T]he [state] LLC provisions on transfer make little sense apart from tax considerations.
First, given the limited liability of LLC members, the transfer of management rights in
an LLC is not the sort of momentous event that it may be in a general partnership. It
follows that the decision-making costs of a unanimity requirement are likely to outweigh
the benefits in most finms ....
The ... most questionable[] aspect of statutory restrictions on transfer of
[T]here is little
management rights is the mandatory character of some statutes ....
justification for reducing the flexibility of contracting by LLCs .... This is particularly
so in light of the fact that the IRS has shown increasing flexibility and that a firm that
permits free transferability may be able to establish that it lacks free transferability and
continuity of life.
Ribstein, supra note 2, at 15 (footnotes omitted); see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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of interests which will then conform with a small businessperson's
expectation of management rights which would accompany a transfer of
interest.
Because of the IRS' Proposed Rules, there are currently two
possible situations. The first scenario ("Scenario 1") will assume that the
Proposed Rules are approved in their current form. Until the Proposed
Rules become final, the second situation ("Scenario 2") is the state of
transferability under current law. By contrasting Scenario 2 against
Scenario 1, this Note concludes that it is reasonable for the states to
adopt the IRS' liberal approach to transferability of full membership
rights in an assignment of interest to the small businessperson.
Transferability of an interest in an LLC is affected by the level of
consent that is required before an assignee is granted full membership
rights from the original LLC members. 4 An interest is fully transferable
when a transferor is able to freely assign her full rights of membership
to an assignee without initially obtaining consent from the remaining
members of the entity.15 Generally, under current law, the member must
be able to transfer an economic right and voting and management rights
to the assignee before free transferability exists for federal income tax
purposes. 6 By requiring unanimous consent from the remaining
members, most state default requirements have also impliedly adopted
this definition of full transferability. 7 This Note examines the transferability issue in light of the interrelation among state LLC statutes, the
Proposed Rules, and the effect of Revenue Procedure 95-10.i"
The first conflict may arise from adoption of the Proposed Rules.
According to this announcement, the present entity classification system
("Resemblance Test")' 9 for federal income tax purposes may be vastly
simplified.2" Under the current Resemblance Test, four prongs are used

14.

See generally HOWARD N. LEFKOWITZ & IRA AKSELRAD, NEW YORK LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY FoRMs AND PRACrICE MANUAL § 1.4AA. (1994) (discussing free transferability of
interests); 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 16.09 (1995) (same).

15. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1993). For an in-depth discussion of
free transferability, see infra part V.D.
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1993).
17. See supra note 9.
18. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501.
19. For a description of this test, see infra part V.
20. Additionally, "[e]limination of the classification regulations with respect to domestic LLCs
and limited partnerships will save taxpayers and the Service substantial transaction costs without
adversely affecting the revenue base derived from the corporate tax." See Susan P. Hamill, The
Taxation ofDomestic Limited LiabilityCompanies andLimited Partnerships:A CaseforEliminating
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to determine whether an LLC will be classified, and therefore taxed,
either as an association taxable as a corporation or as a partnership.2 1
In general, an LLC should be classified as lacking free transferability in order to retain its beneficial partnership tax status22 under the
present Resemblance Test. The Proposed Rules permit eligible future
unincorporated entities to default into or to select partnership tax rates.
As a result, such a system will eliminate the current Resemblance Test.
Therefore, the Proposed Rules permit free transferability of membership
interests, in lieu of the Resemblance Test's restrictive stance on the
transfer of management rights. Upon finalization of the Proposed Rules,
this effect will be in direct conflict with the default provisions of state
LLC statutes that do not permit free transfer of management rights.2"
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The basic forms of doing business and the laws24 which govern
relationships between business people, or entrepreneurs, and the public,
have evolved along with the needs and demands of the economy and the
business community. 2 As market complexity grew exponentially, the
sole proprietorship evolved into the collegial partnership model.26
Partnerships then grew from small businesses between friends and
neighbors to organizations which became cumbersome due to management decisions being based on majority (or greater) voting requirements2 7 and the unlimited liability of partners.28 The demand for more

the PartnershipClassification Regulations,73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 570 (1995) (footnote omitted).
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)-(e) (as amended in 1993); see infra part V.
22. For a description of the "default" limited liability company structure for federal income
tax purposes, see infra text accompanying notes 195-99.
23. According to the IRS, the Proposed Rules will not affect current law until finalized. See
infra notes 63 and 95.
24. "The fundamental purpose of corporate law is to regulate human relationships.... [M]ost
legal thinkers would find this proposition both unstartling and indisputable .... " Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv., 1165, 1165 (1990).
25. THO AS R. DYE, WHo's RUNNING AMERICA?: THE CONSERVATIVE YEARS 15-16 (4th ed.
1986) ("A great deal of power is organized into... economic institutions .... Control of economic
resources provides a continuous and important base of power in any society.... [This in turn,
affects decisions] typically made by governments ....
Studies of power in society must include
economic power.").
26. See S.S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons from
Management Theory, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 645, 650 n.35 (1990) ("Partnership was one of the earliest
forms of organization, second in seniority only to the sole proprietorship").
27. See generally Owen v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713, 716 (Cal. 1941) (holding that when
management of a two-person partnership is crippled by strife and enmity, the court may order
dissolution where the "parties [are] incapable of carrying on the business to their mutual advantage").
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efficient management and a reduction of partner liability then led to the
creation and the proliferation of limited partnerships, z9 which are
statutory creatures with centralized management by a general partner. The

additional hunger for a larger pool of capital 30 and limited liability 3then
2
led to the statutory creation31 and general adoption of corporations.
One could argue that the LLC is the next natural step along the

28. According to the Uniform Partnership Act, partners are "jointly and severally" liable for
torts committed by other partners and are also jointly liable for contracts conducting partnership
business, although "any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership
contract." UNIF. PARTNERSHip ACT §§ 13, 15(a)-(b) (1914).
29. Limited partnerships offer limited partners limited liability, which is analogous to a
shareholder's exposure in a corporation. Under both of these business organizations, the separation
between management and ownership interests entitle the investor to immunity from unlimited
personal liability from business obligations. Therefore, both the limited partner and the shareholder
are denied managerial power in order to avoid conflicts of interest. If the limited partner participates
in management, the limited partner will lose her shield from liability. John G. Schmalz & Samuel
P. Starr, IRS Provides Welcome Certainty in the ClassificationofLLCs as Partnerships,82 J. TAX'N
260, 262 (1995) ("[A] limited partner that becomes too involved in managing the partnership runs
the risk of losing limited liability."). See generally LEFKOWITZ & AKSELRAD, supra note 14, § 1.3
(comparing LLCs, limited partnerships, S corporations, C corporations and limited liability
partnerships in terms of business and tax considerations in tabular form).
30. See ROBERT A. SOLO, THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 71 (1974).

By the third quarter of the nineteenth century... [industrialization] meant the
concentration and centralization of economic power, not in governmental agencies but in
autonomous corporations. Through the instrumentality of this new business form, human
and material resources of unprecedented magnitudes were brought together as integral
operating organizations.
... Control was no longer strictly a function of private ownership.... Rather,
temporal power came to reside in a race of 'artificial' persons, gigantic, immortal, without
souls--the corporations.
Id.
31. Solo explains that after the Civil War, the watershed case of Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), held that a corporation would be treated as a person who
is entitled to constitutional rights granted by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. As a result,
"the right of incorporation [had] become a common right and the corporate form [also had] become
commonplace." Id.
32. As corporations grew, the next logical progression was the creation of monopolistic
enterprises. JONATHAN HUGHES, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 348 (3d ed. 1990) (noting that
monopolies were viewed by some as "a capital-saving innovation... with corporate management
as the efficiency-promoting device: more income from less capital expenditure").
"Traditional legal texts often classify business organizations along a continuum of
complexity, ranging from the simple sole proprietorship on one end and moving through general
partnerships, limited partnerships, and finally, corporations on the other end." Thomas E. Geu,
Understandingthe Limited LiabilityCompany: A Basic ComparativePrimer(pt. 1), 37 S.D. L. REV.
44, 46 (1992).
New York was the first state "to enact a statute permitting the routine incorporation of
businesses." Samuelson, supra note 26, at 650 n.35.
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evolutionary spectrum of business entities. 3 Because business has
demanded an entity form34 that combines the lower tax rate of partnerships, while retaining the limited liability offered by corporations, fortynine states and the District of Columbia have enacted LLC statutes.35
In effect, LLCs are hybrids that have retained the most favorable
characteristics of both partnerships and corporations." Although there
as viable
was some initial reluctance 3738by the IRS to recognize LLCs 39
entities, the IRS' validation of the Wyoming LLC statute, which

33. See Geu, supra note 32, at 50 ("In sum, the LLC is an evolutionary [statutory]
creature . . . ."); see also Ribstein, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that limited liability companies "are
best understood in light of the development of the LLC as an alternative to existing business
fbrms"). Additionally, "[t]he explosion of LLC law in the few years since 1988 confirms ... the
existence of a strong pent-up demand for this form of business." Id. at 4.
34. Business has a legacy of lobbying the government successfully both on the federal and
state levels. During the early twentieth century,
[t]he corporate enterprise became the 'agenda setter' of the American economy for many
decades to come. In major part, the American economy became what the nation's
corporations decided it would be in response, of course, to consumer choice....
[M]odem 'big government' is simply the consequence of its having shared the same bed
with big business.
HUGHES, supra note 32, at 348; see SOLO, supra note 30, at 187 (asserting that a corporation's
"activities and responsibilities overlap and, in important areas, merge with those of the political
authority"); see also KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & LINDA J. MEDCALF, AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES TODAY:
FROM NEOPOLITICS TO NEW IDEAS 82, 115 (1988) (citing corporatism as a strand or school of
political thought that views corporations or businesses as influencing government under the cloak
of national interest and unity while in reality lobbying government in pursuit of self-advancement).
35. See supra note 1 (citing LLC statutes for all states except Vermont, which has pending
LLC legislation as of September 28, 1996).
36. Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: Classification Issues
Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1083, 1103 (1992); C. Timothy Spainhour, Case Note: Limited
Liability Companies in Arkansas: The Knowns and the Unknowns, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
27, 27 (1994) ("The purpose behind the enactment of the LLC legislation was to create a business
entity which would offer investors the limited liability of a corporation while qualifying for taxation
as a partnership."). According to Professor Geu,
the LLC ... attempts to provide limited liability to its members (like a corporation) and
pass-through tax treatment (like a partnership). It is rooted in the traditions of the partnership association (in the United States) and the limitadas (from other countries). Its
apparent purpose is to encourage investment and to attract business and investment from
outside the state of its organization.
Geu, supra note 32, at 50.
37. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
38. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361 (holding that under the Wyoming LLC Act,
the entity at issue should be "classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes").
39. WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-102 to -144 (Supp. 1995). "The basic legislative history of the
Wyoming LLC Act, recounted in a paper submitted to the Wyoming Secretary of State, states that
the 'primary utility of the Wyoming limited liability company derives from its unique blend of
limited liability and tax status as a pass-through entity."' Geu, supranote 32, at 48 (quoting Thomas
N. Long, The Limited Liability Company 3 (Feb. 15, 1989) (unpublished paper, on file with the
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was the nation's first LLC
act, 40 led to a wider acceptance of the LLC
41
entity.
business
as a new
ll.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND CLOSE CORPORATIONS:

SHARED "GENETIC" FAULTS

As "cousins," the LLC has inherited both similarities and defects
encountered by its kin, the close corporation.
LLCs resemble close corporations in several important aspects.42
"The LLC possesses many of the business traits found in close corporations, including[, for the most part,] limited liability protection for all
members and the flexibility to adopt individualized agreements addressing the management, dissolution and transferability of the business.
Many close corporations serve as the sole source of income for their
shareholders.' One characteristic of a close corporation is that "particiWyoming Secretary of State)).
40. Geu, supra note 32, at 45. The Wyoming LLC statute was enacted in 1977, five years
before any other state adopted LLC legislation. Id.
41. See LEFKOWITZ & AKSELRAD, supranote 14, § 1.4.3. "The uncertainty [before Rev. Rul.
88-76] regarding whether the Internal Revenue Service... would classify the LLC as a partnership,
however, slowed the use of the new organization and arrested legislative development [of the LLC
statutes]." Geu, supra note 32, at 45.
The nationwide trend toward recognition and acceptance of the limited liability company... continued ....As of November, 1994, only two states-Hawaii and Vermont-lacked an LLC statute of one form or another.... [T]here is some concern
[however] that the favorable treatment afforded by the Internal Revenue Service ...may
eventually come under congressional scrutiny if it results in a significant revenue loss to
the United States government.
Alan W. Tompkins, CorporationsandLimited Liability Companies,48 SMU L. REv. 1019, 1028-29
(1995); see Spainhour, supra note 36, at 28 (noting that the IRS' Wyoming LLC ruling "set the stage
for rapid development of the new entity across the nation").
42. See Hamill, supra note 20, at 566-67.
43. Id.
44. See Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1318 (N.Y. 1989).
"Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who may be simply an
investor or a speculator and cares nothing for the responsibilities of management, the
shareholder in a close corporation is a co-owner of the business and wants the privileges
and powers that go with ownership. His participation in that particular corporation is
often his principal or sole source of income.... In his capacity as an officer or employee
of the corporation, he looks to his salary for the principal return on his capital investment,
because earnings of a close corporation, as is well known, are distributed in major part
in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits."
Id. (citation omitted) (footnote oitted) (quoting In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178
(N.Y. 1984)); see Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1385 (N.J. 1996) ("Oftentimes ...[shareholders in close corporations] consist of family members or friends whose participation in the business is their principal source of employment and income."); Balvik v. Sylvester,
411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("Employment by the [close] corporation is often the
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pants ... often look to the corporation for a means of livelihood through
payment of salaries or dividends."45 As a natural consequence, participants in close corporations may also be vulnerable because of their
dependence on the benefits and insurance policies that these entities may
offer.
If the LLC is a small business which also acts as the economic
lifeline of the non-member, the non-member assignee could be as
vulnerable as the minority shareholder in a close corporation. 6 In such
an LLC, the unanimity voting obstacle presented by state law4 7 may be
extremely detrimental to the non-member. Without the power to vote and
to manage the LLC, the assignee cannot influence LLC affairs. As a
result, the assignee may not be able to protect her own economic
investment in the LLC. Under current law, this possibility may be
mitigated by states adopting the simple majority voting threshold found
in Revenue Procedure 95-10.4" On the other hand, if states follow the
Proposed Rules' lead in adopting transferability, the assignee may not
encounter this problem.
In the small business/close corporation setting, the participants may
be novices. "'[M]any participants in closely held corporations are 'little
people,' unsophisticated in business and financial matters."' 49 "'As
minority participants in a close corporation may not anticipate dissension
or oppression, and indeed may be unaware of their vulnerability, they
frequently fail to bargain for adequate protection against mistreatment."' 5 Where the assignee of an LLC interest is a novice, she may

shareholder's principal or sole source of income.").
45. LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 206 (2d ed. 1994); see Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 386 ("Earnings of a close corporation, often are

").
distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits .
46. See generally infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of
extending fiduciary responsibilities and other standard of care protections to include non-members
because of the dependent nature of the vulnerable non-member). See also infra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text (regarding protections needed for minority shareholders).
47. See generally infra part V.D (discussing lack of transfer of voting rights in assignment to
non-member assignee); see also supranote 9 (noting that unanimous consent of members is required
for transfer of full membership interest in LLC to non-member assignee in 44 of the 49 present LLC

statutes).
48. See Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(2), 1995-1 C.B. 501,504 (requiring "consent of not less than

a majority of the non-transferring members").
49. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1386 (NJ. 1996) (quoting F. Hodge O'Neal,
Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 884

(1978)).
50. Id. (quoting O'Neal, supra note 49, at 881).
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also encounter identical problems that minority shareholders of a close

corporation face.
Another parallel between these two entities is the lack of a primary

or a secondary market for the minority investor to escape oppressive
actions by the majority-in-interest in each of these respective entities.5 1
Based on the common dynamics between close corporations and LLCs,
the inflexibility present in close corporations would analogously burden
and decrease both the options and the potential solutions offered to a
non-member assignee who owns an economic interest in an LLC.
Additional tensions arise whenever the majority owner acts in selfinterest to the detriment of the minority members of a close corporation. 2 These problems may include management freeze-outs,5 3 abuse
of majority management powers solely to advance the majority interest
at the expense of the minority shareholder,54 along with many other
situations which arise due to the powerlessness of the minority share-

51. SOLOMON AND PALMITER, supra note 45, at 206. Close corporations have "no ready market
for shareholders to dispose of their shares and sometimes [have] contractual limits on transferability."
Additionally,
[p]erhaps the most significant difference [between shareholders of public corporations
and] ... close corporation shareholders is the limited range of options available if they
become disenchanted with the way the corporation is being run or how they are being
treated. In a public corporation, disenchanted shareholders have access to reasonably
efficient and nearly costless securities markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange,
where they can sell their shares-a privilege often called the "Wall Street rule." As a
practical matter, this option is unavailable to close corporation shareholders.
Id.
52. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass. 1976)
(holding that without a legitimate business purpose, the majority interest violated its fiduciary duty
when the majority squeezed out the minority shareholder in a close corporation); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) ("[S]tockholders in the close corporation owe
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe
to one another." (footnotes omitted)); Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)
(partners owe each other a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty"); see also Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that in a close corporation,
where a minority interest is able to exercise a veto power over the majority in interest, the minority
party becomes an ad hoc controlling interest, owing the same fiduciary duties that a majority interest
would ordinarily owe the minority interests).
53. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 571 (N.C. 1983) (forbidding one
brother who was the majority shareholder and manager of the family close corporation from using
his voting power to dismiss his brother, who was the minority shareholder).
54. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980) (noting that
denial of benefits to one shareholder that had been accorded to the majority shareholding directors
violated duty of equal treatment and equal opportunity owed by board of directors to all
shareholders).
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holder. 5 Because assignees in LLCs are more vulnerable56 and resemble minority shareholders in close corporations, the LLC could experience similar problems. Therefore, the states' current stance on the virtual
non-transferability of voting rights57 might exacerbate the plight of the
assignee, who is deprived of the shield provided by voting and management powers which accompany full membership.
IV. SCENARIO

1: REPLACEMENT OF THE RESEMBLANCE TEST WITH
THE PROPOSED RULES

A.

Introduction

At the time of publication of this Note, the IRS has moved closer
towards realizing the initial changes regarding entity classification for
federal tax purposes as originally outlined by Notice 95-14." With the
promulgation of a set of Proposed Rules59 patterned on both Notice 9514 and the resulting comments,6" the IRS has simplified entity classification for federal tax purposes. 61 The IRS "proposes to revise
§§ 301.7701-1 through 301.7701-3 of the Procedure and Administration

55. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1386 (NJ. 1996) ("The controlling
shareholders' voting power enables them to freeze-out minority shareholders by terminating their
employment, excluding them from participation in management decision-making, and reducing their
salary and other income."); Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 558-59 (noting that voting power can be used
by the majority shareholder as a weapon against the minority shareholder).
56. Because non-members have not even reached the status of a minority member, nonmembers will not receive the benefits of membership, which include the power to vote and to bind
the LLC. See infra part V.D. Therefore, the non-member of an LLC is more vulnerable than the
minority shareholder of a close corporation, who is explicitly protected by fiduciary obligations. For
cases supporting minority shareholders' protection under the common law fiduciary concept, see
supra notes 52-55.
57. See supra note 9 (listing states' voting requirements that must be satisfied before an
assignee will receive full membership rights).
58. IRS Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
59. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (1996) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 301) (proposed May 13, 1996).
60. See id.
On April 3, 1995, Notice 95-14, relating to classification of business organizations under section 7701, was published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (1995-1 C.B.
297).... Written comments were received and a public hearing was held ....After
consideration of the comments, the Treasury Department and the IRS propose to replace
the existing classification regulations with a simplified regime that is elective for certain
business organizations.

Id.
61. Id. ("These proposed regulations simplify the existing classification rules.").
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Regulations (26 CFR part 301) to clarify which organizations are
classified as corporations automatically under the Internal Revenue
Code ...and to provide a simple elective regime for classifying other
business organizations."62
If adopted in its present form,63 the Proposed Rules will eliminate
the formalistic' and anachronistic 65 Resemblance Test. 66 In addition
to simplifying determination of the federal tax status of an entity, the
Proposed Rules also strive to decrease the inefficient misallocation of
resources in small businesses that struggle in order to gain a favorable
tax status under the present tax regime.67
Compared with the explicit non-transferability rule as announced in

62. Id.
63. "The regulations are proposed to apply generally for periods beginning on or after the date
the final regulations are published in the Federal Register. Sections 301.7701-1 through 301.7701-3
will continue to apply until these regulations are effective." Id at 21,993 (emphasis omitted). As of
September 28, 1996, the Proposed Rules have yet to be finalized in the Federal Register.
64. The formalistic classification system that is presently in effect is relatively simple to
circumvent under modem state statutes that offer greater flexibility. Id. at 21,990. "One consequence
of the increased flexibility under local law in forming a partnership or other unincorporated business
organization is that taxpayers generally can achieve partnership tax classification for a nonpublicly
traded organization that, in all meaningful respects, is virtually indistinguishable from a corporation."
Id.
65. The IRS recognizes that the present entity classification, or Resemblance Test, has become
outmoded.
The existing regulations for classifying business organizations as associations
(which are taxable as corporations under section 7701(a)(3)) or as partnerships under
section 7701(a)(2) are based on the historical differences under local law between
partnerships and corporations. However, many states have revised their statutes to provide
that partnerships and other unincorporated organizations may possess characteristics that
traditionally have been associated with corporations, thereby narrowing considerably the
traditional distinctions between corporations and partnerships under local law.
In light of these developments, Treasury and the IRS believe that it is appropriate
to replace the increasingly formalistic rules under the current regulations with a much
simpler approach that generally is elective. To further simplify this area, the proposed
regulations provide similar rules for organizations that have a single owner.
Id. at 21,989-90.
66. See generally infra part V (describing and discussing the Resemblance Test that has been
used to determine an entity's classification for federal tax purposes under current law, or Scenario

2).
67. In order to fulfill the formalistic rules to gain a favorable tax treatment of an entity under
the present classification system, a small business may squander resources that it cannot afford. Id.
at 21,990. "To accomplish [a favorable classification] . ..taxpayers and the IRS must expend
considerable resources on classification issues .... Meanwhile, small business organizations may
lack the resources and expertise to achieve the tax classification they want under the current
classification regulations." Id.
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Revenue Ruling 88-76,6s the Proposed Rules' silence implicitly consents
to free transferability from a member to an assignee. Under Revenue
Ruling 88-76, an assignee must receive unanimous support from the nonassigning members before she may become a full member who is eligible
to vote and voice her concerns in the LLC's affairs.6 9 This unanimity
requirement was then relaxed in Revenue Procedure 95-10.7" According
to this rule, the required threshold for an assignee to gain full membership in an LLC was lowered to a majority vote of the remaining LLC
members.7 ' The Proposed Rules no longer view transferability as an
integral element that must be satisfied before an entity receives a
favorable partnership classification for federal tax purposes. Instead, the
transferability prong from the original Resemblance Test has been
eliminated from the proposed entity classification test for federal tax
purposes. Therefore, the Proposed Rules are consistent with the ongoing
trend that has evolved during the past eight years that favors greater
flexibility in the context of transferability.
B. Proposed Changes to Treasury Regulations
Sections 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3
Under section 301.7701-1 of the Proposed Rules,7" "[t]he first step
in the classification process is to determine whether there is a separate73
entity for federal tax purposes (which is a matter of federal tax law).
According to section 301.7701-1(a)(1), federal tax law, and not local law,
is dispositive as to "[w]hether an organization is an entity separate from
its owners for federal tax purposes."7 4 Once an organization is classified
as a separate entity, it will be treated either as a trust or as a business

68. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
69. See id.at 361; see also supra note 9 (listing states' default provisions in LLC statutes and
their consent levels required to transfer management rights to an assignee).

70. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501; see also William E. Sider, Partnership Taxation-What's Hot and What's Not, 74 MICH. BJ. 1034, 1035 (1995) (characterizing Rev. Proc. 9510's transferability rules as "pro-taxpayer"); see Hamill, supra note 20, at 589 ("[W]ith the release
of Revenue Procedure 95-10 ... LLCs [are granted] almost as much flexibility as is accorded to
limited partnerships .... ").

71. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501.
72. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (1996) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 301) (proposed May 13, 1996).

73. Id. at 21,990.
74. Id. at 21,994.
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entity for federal tax purposes" under proposed sections 301.7701-2,76
301.7701-377 and 301.7701-4. 78
Assuming that the organization's management is separate from its
ownership for federal tax purposes, the entity classification test may then
proceed to Proposed Rule section 301.7701-2. This section "specifies
those business entities that automatically are classified as corporations for
federal tax purposes. '79 These business entities qualify for association
taxation as long as the organization does not satisfy the trust classification rules8" as outlined in Proposed Rule section 301.7701-4.8' If an
organization is not a trust, "[a] business entity with two or more
members is classified for federal tax purposes as either a corporation or
a partnership. 8 2
If the entity is not mandatorily treated either as a corporation or as
a trust, the business entity is an eligible entity83 that has discretionary,
or elective powers, to select its federal tax status under Proposed Rule
section 301.7701-3.84 This section "provide[s] that a business entity
with at least two members can [elect to] be classified as either a
partnership or an association." 5 The Proposed Rules further simplify
the entity federal tax classification system by providing that tax status
'"elections are necessary only when an eligible entity chooses to be
classified initially as other than the default classification or when an

75. Id. at 21,990.
76. Id. at 21,995.
77. Id. at 21,996-97.

78. Id. at 21,997.
79. Id. at 21,990. In general,
[t]he proposed regulations clarify that business entities that are classified as corporations

for federal tax purposes include corporations denominated as such under applicable law,
as well as associations, joint-stock companies, insurance companies, organizations that
conduct certain banking activities, organizations wholly owned by a State, organizations
that are taxable as corporations under a provision of the Code other than section
7701(a)(3), and certain organizations formed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction or
a U.S. possession, territory, or commonwealth.

Id.
80. Id. at 21,995 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-2(a)).

81. Id. at 21,997.
82. Id. at 21,995 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-2(a)).

83. An eligible entity is a business that is not a per se corporation as defined under Proposed
Rule §§ 301.7701-2(b)(1), (3)-(8). "An eligible entity with at least two members can elect to be
classified as either an association (and thus a corporation under § 301.7701-2(b)(2)) or a
partnership .... " 61 Fed. Reg. 21,996 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-3(a)).
84. See 61 Fed. Reg. 21,990.
85. Id.
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86
eligible entity chooses to change its classification."
The Proposed Rules permit domestic eligible entities to automatically default87 into a partnership88 tax classification whenever the entity
has two or more members.8 9 Proposed section 301.7701-3(c) outlines
the procedure90 that applies to eligible entities that wish either to avoid
the partnership default tax status or decide to change its present
classification.9' If a new eligible entity elects92 to change its status,
then "it cannot change its classification by election again during the sixty
months succeeding the effective date of the election., 93 Finally,
Proposed Rule section 301.7701-4 governs the tax status of an organization that is a trust for federal tax purposes.94

86. Id. at 21,996 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-3(a), referring to Proposed Rules
§§ 301.7701-3(b), (c)).

87. "The proposed regulations are designed to provide most eligible entities with the
classification they would choose without requiring them to file an election. Thus, the proposed
regulations provide default classification rules that aim to match expectations. An eligible entity that
wants the default classification need[s] not file an election." Id. at 21,992.
88. "The proposed regulations define the term partnership to include any business entity that
has at least two members and that is not classified as a corporation." Id. at 21,991.
89. Id. at 21,996 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i)). "Thus, a newly formed domestic
eligible entity will be classified as a partnership if it has two or more members unless an election
is filed to classify the entity as an association; no affirmative action need be taken by the entity to
ensure partnership classification." Id. at 21,992.
90. "An eligible entity may elect its classification by filing an election with the appropriate
service center." Id.
91. Id. at 21,996 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-3(c)).
92. "ITihe proposed regulations require that an election be signed by: (1) Each member of the
entity, or (2) any officer, manager, or owner who is authorized to make the election and who
represents to having such authorization under penalties of perjury." Id. at 21,993.
93. Id. at 21,996 (citing Proposed Rule § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(ii)).
94. Because a trust classification for federal tax purposes is beyond the scope of this Note, the
specific amendments and changes may be further researched at 61 Fed. Reg. 21,997 for more
information pertaining to Proposed Rule § 301.7701-4.
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V.

SCENARIO

2: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MECHANICS AND THE

RESEMBLANCE TEST: DETERMINATION OF ENTITY TYPE FOR

FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES 95

Because LLCs are unincorporated business entities, the LLC may be
classified for federal income tax purposes as either a partnership or as an
association taxable as a corporation." Partnerships are "pass through"
entities that are taxed once because income "flow[s] through to individual
partners."97 On the other hand, as associations for federal income tax
purposes, corporations are taxed twice. 98 Therefore, an LLC must be
classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes in order to realize the
beneficial tax status offered by partnerships.99

95. As of the writing of this Note, the Proposed Rules are currently under study. See supra
note 63. Therefore, the Resemblance Test, as modified by Rev. Proc. 95-10, is the current law. Rev.
Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 502-03. This Note examines the Resemblance Test both before and
after the promulgation of Rev. Proc. 95-10.
A Revenue Procedure describes the steps that a taxpayer must satisfy before she could
"obtain[] an advance ruling as to whether an LLC will be taxed as a partnership." Gerald F. Stack,
Recent Developments ConcerningLimitedLiabilityCompanies, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 50, SeptJOct. 1995,
at 50. Additionally, Rev. Proc. 95-10
only sets forth the standards which must be met in order to obtain a favorable ruling from
the [IRS] that the LLC will be classified as a partnership. It is not a statement of the
substantive law in this area.... Nonetheless, the careful practitioner will want to stay
within the safe harbor of Rev. Proc. 95-10.

Id. at n.6.
96. LEFKOWtTZ & AKSELRAD, supra note 14, § 1.4.1. In determining the tax status of an entity,
the IRS may also tax an entity as a trust. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1993); see
also Schmalz & Starr, supranote 29, at 260 ("Because the [Internal Revenue] Code does not refer
directly to LLCs, these entities must be put in one of the other pigeonholes--corporation,
partnership, or trust-to determine their tax status.").
97. Jonathan R-Macey, The Limited LiabilityCompany: Lessonsfor CorporateLaw, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 433, 434 (1995).
98. Id. Double taxation results from the income that is taxed both at the corporate level and
as income distributed by the corporation to the corporation's investors. Id.
[As a] taxable entity... [a corporation] pays tax.. . before making any 'distribution'
of money or property to its owners. The receipt of the distribution by the owner of a
taxable entity is, in turn, income to the owner which the owner must report on its own
tax return. Thus, the income of a taxable entity [such as a corporation that is treated as
an association] is taxed twice.
Thomas E. Geu, Understandingthe Limited Liability Company: A Basic ComparativePrimer(pt. 2),
37 S.D. L. REV. 467, 470 (1992).
99. "Limited liability companies are primarily formed in order to obtain pass-through tax
status." Macey, supra note 97, at 442. "One of the primary attractions to the LLC as a choice of
business organization is the pass-through taxation treatment." Spainhour, supra note 36, at 34.
As a result of being classified as a pass-through entity, the LLC members will be liable for
allocations of "income, gain, or loss [which] passes through to the... members to be reported on
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In order to determine whether or not an LLC will be taxed as a
partnership for federal tax purposes, an attorney or the IRS will test the
LLC for its corporate or partnership characteristics. If the LLC resembles
a corporation, then the LLC will not receive the beneficial partnership tax
status.100 The current entity test, or Resemblance Test, 01 has the

following four elements:" 2 (1) continuity of life, (2) centralized

management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free transferability of
interests.0 3 A partnership for federal tax purposes will have either one
or two of the previous elements." ° An entity will be taxed as a corporation if it has either three or four of these characteristics. 5 In distinguishing between corporations and partnerships for federal tax purposes,

their [tax] returns... whether or not they received a distribution of money or property from the
enterprise." Geu, supra note 98, at 485.
100. According to the watershed Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, the IRS found for the first
time that a Wyoming LLC that "lacked the corporate characteristics of free transferability of interests
and continuity of life... [would be classified] as a partnership for federal income tax purposes."
LEFKOWITZ & AKSELRAD, supranote 14, § 1.4.3.; Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361; see also
Miller, supra note 3, at 23 n.3. ("In 1988, the questions concerning the taxation of limited liability
companies were largely resolved. '[T]he l[ntemal] R[evenueJ S[ervice] issued Revenue Ruling 88-76,
[1988-2 C.B. 361] which stated that a Wyoming L[imited] L[iability] C[ompany], none of whose
members or designated managers were personally liable for any debts of the company, was to be
classified as a partnership for federal income tax purposes."' (alterations in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Joseph A. Rodriguez, Comment, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Limited
Liability and Taxation Concerns in Other Jurisdictions,27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 539, 558
(1992)).
101. See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 733 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (referring to the entity
test as a "resemblance" test).
102. The evolution of this entity tax status determination test stems from Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). See Tompkins, supra note 41, at 1029 n.67. Two additional
factors existed in the test. These characteristics were: "(1) the existence of associates [and] (2) the
objective to carry on a business and to divide the gains therefrom .... Id. Because both of these
elements are fundamental to partnerships and corporations, it would be moot to include these two
prongs of the original test in the present Resemblance Test. "[C]haracteristics common to
partnerships and corporations are not material in attempting to distinguish between an association
[taxed as a corporation] and a partnership [for federal income tax purposes]." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1993).
103. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)-(e).
104. See Miller, supra note 3, at 24 n.3 ("[T]he failure to possess more corporate than
noncorporate features result[s] in classification as a partnership for tax purposes.").
105. "An organization will be treated as an association [which is taxed as a corporation] if the
corporate characteristics are such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a
partnership .... Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). Furthermore, "an unincorporated organization [such
as an LLC] shall not be classified as an association unless such organization has more corporate
characteristics than noncorporate characteristics." Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3); Larson v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 159, 172 (1976); Miller, supra note 3, at 24 n.3; see Morrissey,296 U.S. at 359-60.
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the IRS will weigh each of these elements equally.' 6 Revenue Procedure 95-10 provides "specific ruling standards and indicates continued
IRS acceptance of partnership tax treatment for LLCs [through the
continued use of the Resemblance Test]."1 7
A.

Continuity of Life

1. Before Revenue Procedure 95-10
Several factors or events are considered in determining whether an
entity lacks the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. Under the
Procedure and Administration Regulations, "if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will
cause a dissolution0 8 of the organization, continuity of life does not
exist."
Under federal tax regulation, the operating agreement may
permit the remaining members to continue the business "in the event of
the death or withdrawal of any member, but such agreement does not
establish continuity of life if under local law the death or withdrawal of
any member causes a dissolution of the organization. 11 Therefore, an
LLC may be continued by the remaining members despite being
dissolved, while simultaneously avoiding the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life."'
Dissolution may also be triggered by any of the following: when a
specified event occurs, after passage of a certain amount of time, l ' by
the submission of written consent by the members, or by a judicial de-

106. Larson, 66 T.C. at 172 (holding that each prong from Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 359, will be
weighed equally). The court in Larson held that the limited partnership in question was a partnership
for federal tax purposes while possessing both free transferability and centralized management, but
lacking continuity of life and limited liability. Id. at 185.
107. Barbara C. Spudis, LLCs: Recent Developments and the Developing Uses of HybridLLCs,
in 3 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DIsPosIIONs, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGs, REORGANIZATONS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 1995, at 1003, 1022 (PLI Tax Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. J-373, 1995). See generally Ribstein, supra note 2 (arguing
that although Revenue Procedure 95-10 provides much needed guidance, some new problems have
been created).

108. A dissolution occurs whenever there is "a change in the relationship between [an
organization's] members as determined under local law." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2). This
section also states that a dissolution results when a partner leaves a general partnership, which then
destroys the agency relationships between the departing partner and the general partnership. Id.

109. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
110. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(2).
I11. Id.
112. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT.
lifespan of LLCs).

§

17-15-107(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995) (setting forth a 30-year default
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cree." 3 Whenever a member has the individual power to dissolve the
organization, the entity will lack continuity of life." 4 The existence of
such an involuntary dissolution of the LLC will avoid the corporate
continuity of life determination."' Additionally, continuity of life does
not exist if consent by a majority vote (or greater) is required by the
remaining majority in interest partners in order to avoid dissolution." 6
In light of the LLC's goals, the founding member(s) may prefer to
require a unanimous vote by the remaining members in interest after the
occurrence of one of the above dissolution events." 7 This policy choice
will increase the difficulty of extending the LLC's life after the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion of any member
or any of the other above-specified incidents which will cause dissolution
of the organization. Therefore, the founding member(s) of an LLC may
avoid continuity of life by creating a requirement which is higher than
the majority-vote threshold". of the remaining members in interest for
the perpetuation of the LLC's lifespan.
On the other hand, the LLC may preserve its continuity while
avoiding such a corporate classification by "impos[ing] on each member
a contractual obligation to exerqise the right to continue the company
upon dissolution."'1 9 Simultaneously, the articles of organization could
require unanimous consent from the members while limiting "the
available remedies for breach of the obligation [to continue the company
upon dissolution] to money damages and not specific performance."' 20
Therefore, a member may not have sufficient incentive to vote to
dissolve the LLC,' while simultaneously maintaining the lack of
continuity of life label which is necessary for a partnership classification

113. See Miller, supra note 3, at 35-36 n.28.
114. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3).
115. Miller, supra note 3, at 24 n.3.
116. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b); see Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176,
185-86 (1942); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-27-033 (Apr. 8, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-26-035 (Mar. 26, 1992);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989).

117. Upon creation of an LLC, the founding member(s) may define the voting requirement (i.e.,
majority or even unanimity of the remaining members in interest, depending on the LLC's goals and
policies), in connection with continuity of life in the operating agreement.
118. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
119. Jimmy G. McLaughlin, Commentary, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choicefor
Professionals,45 ALA. L. REv. 231, 237 (1993); see Edward J. Roche, Jr. et al., Limited Liability
Companies Offer Pass-ThroughBenefits Without S Corp. Restrictions, 74 J. TAX'N 248, 249 (1991)
(discussing such a contractual provision which must be exercised "within 90 days after an event of
withdrawal").

120. McLaughlin, supra note 119, at 237.
121.

Id.
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for federal income tax purposes.
2. Changes After Revenue Procedure 95-10
If the LLC elects or appoints member-managers, and either the
controlling statute or operating agreement "provides that the death,

insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member-manager causes a dissolution of the LLC without further action
of the members,"'" the IRS will generally rule that the LLC lacks

continuity of life if consent to continue the LLC must come from "not
less than a majority in interest of the remaining members."'" Under
section 5.01(2), the same majority in interest124 consent rule applies to
LLCs that "do not designate or elect one or more members as managers."' 25 Both sections 5.01(1) and 5.01(2) require that the list of
dissolution events must apply to every member-manager, or member,
respectively. Additionally, "the [IRS] will not rule that the LLC lacks
continuity of life unless the taxpayer clearly establishes ... that the event
or events selected provide a meaningful possibility 26 of dissolu127
tion.'

122. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.01(1), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
123. Id.
124. As used in Revenue Procedure 95-10, majority in interest was defined in an earlier
promulgation by the IRS. See Rev. Proc. 94-46, 1994-2 C.B. 688 (holding that the "majority in
interest" requirement "will be satisfied if remaining [members] owning a majority of the profits
interests and a majority of the capital interests owned by all the remaining (members] agree to
continue the [enterprise]"). New York has a similar definition of majority in interest. See supranote
9.
125. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.01(2), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
126. In order for a dissolution event to be meaningful, the member-manager should be an
individual. Because a corporate-manager in an LLC cannot die, any dissolution event that is so
predicated is impossible, which violates the "meaningful possibility of dissolution" requirement
found in Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.01(4), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 502-03. See Stack, supra note 95, at 51; see
also Hamill, supra note 20, at 593 n.126 ("The [IRS] has indicated informally that a meaningful
possibility of dissolution requires that a legal possibility, but not necessarily a factual possibility,
must exist."); Schmalz & Starr, supra note 29, at 263 ("Rev. Proc. 95-10 adopts a stricter continuityof-life standard for LLC ruling purposes... "').
127. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.01(4), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
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B.

CentralizedManagement

1. Before Revenue Procedure 95-10
12 8
LLCs generally may choose from several management models.
Some states permit a prorated division of management powers' 29 based

on each member's proportional capital contribution ("Proportional
Management"). 30 "Assuming no agreement to the contrary is included
in the articles of organization, these LLCs will lack the corporate
characteristic of centralized management."' 31
If the jurisdiction offers a flexible LLC statute, either an LLC's
operating agreement may opt for management of the entity by all
members ("Member Management" or "Member Management Model"),
or the statute itself may provide Member Management as a default

provision. Under this regime, each individual LLC member may bind the
LLC. Member Management parallels the general partnership's diffuse

management structure in which powers are vested equally in every
partner of the partnership. In a general partnership, each individual
partner has the power to single-handedly manage and to bind the
partnership. 32 Because the member-managed LLC will also possess
limited liability, the LLC may wish to adopt the corporate quality of
continuity of life. For reasons discussed below,'33 the LLC will usually
be unable to include the corporate feature of free transferability of

interest.
Most states' default management provisions opt for the Member

128. An LLC's management structure will depend on the operating agreement's choice of either
centralized management or member management. Spainhour, supranote 36, at 36; see Miller, supra
note 3, at 24 n.3 ("Depending on the actual organization[al] structure of a limited liability company,
it may also be possible for the entity to lack centralized management . '"(citation omitted).
Additionally, "[a]n operating or management agreement governs business operations and
relationships among members of a limited liability company" Id. at 25-26.
129. This proportional representation concept is "more similar to the corporate theory of 'one
share one vote' than to the partnership theory of 'one partner one vote."' Geu, supra note 32, at 63.
130. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422
(West Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 31-lA-18
(Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (Supp. 1995).
131. McLaughlin, supra note 119, at 239. "[I]t is unclear how the [IRS] would view a situation
where the managing members owned more than twenty percent of the LLC's interest." Id. at 240.
132. See UNmr. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18(e) (1914) (superseded by UNIF. PARTN4ERsmP ACT
§ 401(0 (1994)).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 195-99.
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Management Model. 34 Because LLCs face the same problems that
close corporations encounter, 135 management structure may either
strengthen or weaken the minority member. 36 By consolidating management in a handful of members, the minority interests are further
delegated to the outer fringes of power. This additional segregation of the

minority member further weakens her security and increases her
vulnerability. 137 This problem parallels the non-member assignee's
voiceless property interest in an LLC. 38 Because the non-member
cannot vote or manage the LLC, 139 the non-member is left to the mercy
of her LLC colleagues.
This result highlights the problem with the states' current stance that
voting rights cannot be freely alienated directly from the member
assignor to the non-member assignee. Therefore, states requiring
unanimity of consent should permit the right to vote and manage to
transfer automatically to the non-member assignee. Without this power,
the non-member may only have recourse via a judicial solution, which
is both after the fact and may have been fully avoidable had the states
adopted a freer transfer of voting and management rights default standard.
The third LLC management model is analogous to a corporation's
centralized management ("Centralized Management" or "Centralized
Management Model") structure. 140 An entity has Centralized Manage-

134. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 401(a) (McKinney 1995) ("Unless the articles of
organization provides for management of the limited liability company by a manager or managers
or a class or classes of managers, management of the limited liability company shall be vested in
its members ... .
135. See supra part III.
136. For example, adopting either Member Management or Proportional Management may
benefit the minority member much more than an LLC which selects the Centralized Management
Model.
137. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 commentary (Supp. 1994):
The emerging limited liability company model adopted by most limited liability company
statutes calls for management directly by the members. This is based on several important
factors. First, because limited liability company interests are not freely transferable, members who are dissatisfied with their investments must resort to active involvement rather
than simply exiting the firm as investors in [a] public corporation can.
Id.
138. See supra part III.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 603(a)(2) (McKinney 1995) ("Except as provided
in the operating agreement,... an assignment of a membership interest does not ... entitle the
assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the limited liability company or... to
exercise any rights or powers of a member ...").
140. "The existence of managers somewhat complicates the statutory scheme because it
bifurcates the management function from ownership and, at least to some extent, provides for
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ment whenever a sub-group of the whole organization has the sole and
exclusive power to "make the management decisions necessary to the
conduct of the business for which the organization was formed." la '
Managers may also be non-members who are either elected for a term or
automatically reappointed. 42 The method of appointing management
is irrelevant to the centralized management prong as long as the effect of
the appointment is to concentrate exclusive managerial power in an
individual or group which controls the LLC.'43 In addition to being
independent of the members, management cannot act as mere agents
administering the principals' demands.'" Therefore, individuals who
have management powers in an LLC with Centralized Management
"resemble in powers and functions the directors of a statutory corpora45
tion."
2. Changes After Revenue Procedure 95_10146
A key change' 47 is Revenue Procedure 95-10's "emphasis on the
48
distinction between manager-managed and member-managed LLCs.5'
If the LLC "is managed by the members exclusively in their membership
generally will rule that the LLC lacks centralized
capacity, the [IRS]
149
management.'

The IRS will rule that centralized management exists whenever the

'centralized management."' Geu, supra note 32, at 64. Because the addition of a managerial layer
separates ownership from management, the fiduciary principles from corporate law may be triggered
whenever a conflict of interest exists between the management and the owners or the members. Id.
at 64 n. 155; see also supra note 29 (discussing the separations between management and
shareholders in a corporation and the analogous division between general partners and limited
partners in a limited partnership, which is designed to avoid conflicts of interests in each respective
business organization).
141. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1993).
142. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(c)(2); see Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344,359 (1935).
Moreover, the [LLC] members have the flexibility to follow the partnership model and
designate managers who, like a general partner of a limited partnership, may serve in
such capacity for an indefinite period of time, or to follow the corporate model and
provide for election, removal and replacement of managers on an annual or other
basis.... [This may be provided by private] operating agreements.
ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 commentary (Supp. 1994).
143. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2).
144. Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(3).
145. Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(1).
146. For an interesting discussion and examination of potential problems introduced by Revenue
Procedure 95-10 regarding the management distinction, see Ribstein, supra note 2, at 39-41.
147. This new focus materially affects free transferability. See infra part V.D.
148. Ribstein, supra note 2, at 38.
149. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.03(l), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
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elected or designated member-managers (as a group) own less than
twenty percent of the interests of the LLC. 150 However, "even if the
aggregate ownership requirement is satisfied, the [IRS] will consider . . member control of the member-managers (whether direct or
indirect), in determining whether the LLC lacks centralized management."" ' Furthermore, the IRS may rule that Centralized Management
exists "if the member-managers are subject to periodic elections by the

members or, alternatively, if the non-managing members have a
substantially unrestricted power to remove the member-manager."' 52 It
seems that "nonmanagers' control over the manager
indicates representa53
tive-and therefore centralized-management."'
C. Limited Liability
1. Before Revenue Procedure 95-10
Limited liability is the main corporate characteristic that LLCs strive
to achieve. 154 This element protects an entity's members from liability

for "the debts of or claims against the organization [under local
law]."' 55 Similar to corporations, LLC members are only liable for the

150. Id. § 5.03(2), 1995-1 C.B. at 504; see also Schmalz & Starr, supra note 29, at 262 ("A
major development in Rev. Proc. 95-10 is its adoption of a special rule in Reg. 301.7701-2(c)(4),
which.., provides that a limited partnership has centralized management if substantially all the
interests in the partnership are owned by limited partners.").
151. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.03(2), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
152. Schmalz & Starr, supra note 29, at 262.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 260.
The IRS has summarily dismissed this corporate characteristic [from the Resemblance
Test when determining whether an entity is an association taxable as either a corporation
or as a partnership for federal income tax purposes] because members of an LLC will
undoubtedly be held to have limited liability, since limited liability is one of the primary
reasons for forming an LLC.
Spainhour, supra note 36, at 36; see Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233, 235 (pertaining to a
Delaware LLC); Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229, 231 (pertaining to a Colorado LLC); Rev. Rul.
93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227, 229 (pertaining to a Virginia LLC); Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361
(pertaining to a Wyoming LLC). "[Limited liability companies offer limited liability as a matter of
course ....
Macey, supra note 97, at 435; see Geu, supra note 98, at 503 ("[L]imited liability is
one of the centerpieces of LLC design."); Sylvester J. Orsi, Comment, The Limited Liability
Company: An OrganizationalAlternativeforSmall Business,70 NEB. L. REV. 150, 174 (1991) ("l]t
appears quite clear that an LLC will always possess limited liability for purposes of federal income
tax classification:').
155. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1993). Under this section, "a creditor of
an organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of the organization to the extent that
the assets of such organization are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim." Id.
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15 6
initial amount that was invested in the entity.

2. Changes After Revenue Procedure 95-10
In order for an LLC to obtain a ruling that it lacks limited liability,
a member, or members, must assume "personal liability for all (but not
less than all) obligations of the LLC, pursuant to express authority
granted in the controlling statute."' 57 The assuming members are
required to own an aggregate net worth of at least ten percent of total
contributions both at the time of the ruling request and throughout the
LLC's existence.' 5 8 The IRS will apply close scrutiny if the assuming
members do not satisfy the ten percent safe-harbor threshold.'59 The
assuming member, or members, could overcome the close scrutiny if the
interest in
member has "substantial assets' 6° (other than the member's
161
LLC.'
the
of
creditor
a
by
reached
be
the LLC) that could
D. Free Transferabilityof Interests
1. Before Revenue Procedure 95-10
For an entity to have
the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests... each
of its members or those members owning substantially all 62 of the
interests in the organization have the power, without the consent of
other members, to substitute for themselves in the same organization a
person who is not a member of the organization. In order for this
power of substitution to exist in the corporate sense, the member must

156. McLaughlin, supra note 119, at 241 ("The owners' liability is restricted to their investment

in the entity."). On the other hand, a member will still be responsible for personally malignant or
negligent
members
the result
he or she

acts. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LAB. Co. LAW § 420 (McKinney 1995) (providing that LLC
will not be shielded by limited liability if their "acts were committed in bad faith or were
of active and deliberate dishonesty and were material to the cause of action ... or ...that
personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he or she was not

legally entitled").
157. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.04, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
158. Id. § 5.04, 1995-1 C.B. at 504-05.
159. Id. § 5.04, 1995-1 C.B. at 505.
160. The assuming member's net worth will be calculated pursuant to the criteria set forth in
k 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 92-88, 1992-2 C.B. 496. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.04, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 505.
161. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.04, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 505.
162. See Rev. Proc. 92-33, 1992-1 C.B. 782, 782 (holding that although "'substantially all"'
depends on facts and circumstances surrounding a particular organization, "a[n] [organization] lacks
free transferability of interests if... the [operating] agreement expressly restricts ...the
transferability of [organization] interests representing more than 20 percent of all interests
in... capital, income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit").
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be able, without the consent of other members, to confer upon
his
63
substitute all the attributes of his interest in the organization.

A member's interest in an LLC has two components. First, the
member's investment entitles her to share in the LLC's fortunes and
losses. Second, investment in the LLC may also entitle the member to
vote and to manage the LLC.' 6 Therefore, substitution, 16 or full
transferability, exists only when the member assignor is able to transfer
unilaterally her full interest in both the profits and her managerial powers
to a non-member assignee without initially obtaining consent from the
remaining LLC members."6 If a member only transfers to an assignee
the right to receive profits from the LLC, the LLC does not retain the
free transferability characteristic because the assignee is neither
substituted for the assignor nor enfranchised by the second prong of
membership, which grants a full member the power to manage or to
vote. 167 Because the assignee does not receive the entire bundle of
property rights, there is no free transferability. 6 8 In such a case, the

163. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1993).
164. This assumes the LLC has adopted the Member Management Model, and not a Centralized
Management Model.
165. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (describing the requirements for the substitution of
members); Orsi, supra note 154, at 174 ("[Slubstitution refers to a complete transfer of all the
attributes of the member's interest in the organization, not merely a right to share in the profits."
(footnote omitted)).
166. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) ("Thus, the characteristic of free transferability of
interests does not exist in a case in which each member can, without the consent of other members,
assign only his right to share in profits but cannot so assign his rights to participate in the
management of the organization.").
167. Having managerial power may be very important in the context of an LLC. LLCs tend to
be small entities, see supra note 3, due to a lack of transferability. See Miller, supra note 3, at 68
("An investment in a limited liability company lacks liquidity to the extent that there is no public
market to dispose of the interest."). As a result of this lack of transferability, LLCs are deprived of
the opportunity to raise large amounts of capital through the market system. Because of the relatively
small size of LLCs, combined with the lack of transferability and non-existence of a freely accessible
marketplace, many of the standard of care problems and fiduciary issues that majority interests in
small corporations confront resurface in the LLC context. Orsi, supra note 154, at 161 (noting that
because of potential conflict of interests between the majority and the minority members, the
minority members may be vulnerable to freeze-outs and other problems which may be mitigated by
imposing a "standard of utmost good faith and loyalty often used in both the partnership and close
corporation settings'). Therefore, voting and management rights provide an extra layer of protection
for the minority LLC member in addition to the fiduciary concept. For a parallel discussion favoring
free transfer of voting and management rights, see infra part VI.B.
168. This partial transfer of property rights from an LLC member to the non-member assignee
parallels transfers in a general partnership. See Geu, supra note 32, at 79.
The assignment of an interest in the partnership does not, however, transfer any of the
partner's management rights in the partnership ... even though the assignee is entitled
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assignor may retain her voting rights despite having assigned her rights
to share in the LLC's profits to the assignee. 69 Therefore, by patterning LLC law on general partnership law under the Uniform Partnership
model, the member assignor may expect to retain her residual voting and
management rights while the non-member assignee receives the right to
share in the profits and losses of the LLC. As a result of the nontransferability of management rights, the LLC is able to ensure that the
partnership characteristic of non-transferability for federal income tax
purposes is maintained under Scenario 2. In essence, such a tax status
the general consent requirements found in most
election conflicts with
70
statutes.
LLC
state
On the other hand, under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, a transfer of a partner's entire interest to a non-member terminates
the assignor's partner status in the partnership, 71 except for the

partner's original obligations. 7 Once again, the assignee may become
a limited partner only if the limited partners unanimously consent to
substitution of this new limited partner to the limited partnership.
Additionally, there is "no free transferability of interest if under local law
a transfer
of a member's interest results in the dissolution of the
''
[LLC] .

to receive what the assigning partner would have received upon dissolution absent the
assignment. In other words, the assignee does not become a partner.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In a transfer from an LLC member to a non-member assignee, the assignee will not receive
voting or management rights, which parallels the partnership situation where the assignee will not
become fully empowered. As a result, the assignee of the LLC interest will not automatically become
a fall member with voting rights. Cf. Hamill, supra note 20, at 597 ("Typically, with minor and
unimportant variations, the [state limited liability company] statutes forbid the LLC members from
transferring an interest in both the economic and the governance rights to a non-member unless
either all or a majority of the non-transferring members consent to the transfer."); supra note 9
(listing LLC state statutes' consent requirements).
169. See Geu, supra note 32, at 79 (citing UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29 (1914) (superseded
by UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801 et seq. (1994))) ("Indeed, the assigning partner remains a partner
in spite of the assignment. .. .'); Spainhour, supra note 36, at 37 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-19-029
(Feb. 7, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-52-039 (Oct. 2, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013 (Apr. 25, 1990);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010 (June 16, 1989)).
170. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
171. REVISED UNtF. LIMrIED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 702 (1985).
172. REVISED UNIF. LIBITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 502(b)-(c), 704(c).
173. REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 704(a)(ii). It is also possible for the assignee
to become a limited partner if the assignor was accorded the authority to assign such a right
explicitly in the partnership agreement. Id. § 704(a)(i).
174. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1993).
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The IRS has also considered modified free transferability. 75 In
effect, before a member is able to transfer her interest in the LLC to a
non-member assignee, the remaining LLC members have a right of first
refusal 76 before the assignor is permitted to sell to an outside nonmember. 7 7 This initial offering to members within the LLC must be
based on fair market value. 171 "In determining the classification of an
organization, the presence of this modified corporate characteristic will
be accorded less significance
than if such characteristic were present in
179
an unmodified form."'
2. Changes After Revenue Procedure 95-10
Significant changes announced in Revenue Procedure 95-10 concern
the free transferability prong. 80 Although Revenue Procedure 95-10
divides free transferability into either centrally-managed LLCs or
member-managed LLCs, the consent rules governing transferability are
facially parallel with the potential for significantly different impacts.
a. Centrally-Managed LLC
If an LLC is managed by elected or appointed member-managers
and the controlling statute or operating agreement "provides that each
member, or those members owning more than 20 percent of all interests
in the LLC's capital, income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit'' s need
81 2
at least "a majority of the non-transferring member-managers"'
consent in order to convey full membership rights to the assignee, the
IRS will usually rule that the LLC lacks free transferability of interests.' 83
Several implications flow from the above rule. Up to seventy-nine
percent of the LLC may be freely transferable, while simultaneously

175. See id. § 301.7701-2(e)(2).
176.
contract
177.
178.

That is, a member has the first opportunity to purchase or "to meet terms of [the] proposed
before it is executed." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1325 (6th ed. 1990).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2).
Id.

179. Id.
180. See Spudis, supranote 107, at 1028-29 (raising the possibility that Revenue Procedure 9510 decreases the burden regarding transfers that substitute the assignee in lieu of the assignor).
181. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(1), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also Schmalz & Starr, supra note 29, at 263 ("[T]he existence of centralized
management depends on a concentration of the legal right to manage .... ").
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retaining the non-transferability prong for federal income tax purposes." Not only has the consent requirement been reduced from unanimity to a simple majority, the required consent is only needed from a
majority of the member-managers, which is much more lenient than the
former unanimity requirement of consent from all members of the LLC.
"The combination of [these two factors] ... allows LLCs the same
flexibility enjoyed by limited partnerships. LLCs can lack free transferability on a technical basis, yet retain the business advantages of minimal
transferability restrictions."' 8'5 On the other hand, this liberalization of
transferability is tempered by the "meaningful restriction" requirement,
or the existence of a member's power to withhold consent to the
proposed transfer. 86
b. Member-Managed LLC
In a member-managed LLC, the same consent threshold applies as
found in the centrally-managed LLC.' 7 Additionally, the same implications, as discussed earlier, would also flow from this rule. On the other
hand, the consent requirement may be somewhat higher and more
restrictive because "consent of not less than a majority of the nontransferring members"'8 8 is required. The preceding conclusion assumes that member-managed LLCs would have a greater number of
"voters" than in the centrally-managed LLC. Thus, because an assignee
would most likely need the consent from fewer elected or appointed
member-managers than from a vote that would be considered by all the
non-transferring members of an LLC, section 5.02(2) may effectively
decrease the ease of transferability. Therefore, it is arguable that an
assignee in a member-managed LLC may have greater difficulty in
becoming a full member than an assignee who seeks membership in a
centrally-managed LLC.
According to section 5.02(3), which applies to both centrallymanaged and member-managed LLCs, "consent of a majority includes
either a majority in interest, a majority of either the capital or profits
interests in the LLC, or a majority determined on a per capita basis."' 9
Again, the IRS requires that meaningful consent, or the ability to
184. See infra note 191.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Hamill, supra note 20, at 597.
See Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(4), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
See id. § 5.02(2), 1995-1 C.B. at 504.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 5.02(3), 1995-1 C.B. at 504 (citation omitted).
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"withhold consent to the transfer... of the interests '9 must exist
before the IRS will rule that an LLC lacks free transferability for federal
income tax purposes.
VI.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

A. Rewriting the States' TransferabilityStandards
In light of all the above problems that LLCs share with close
corporations, a reasonable argument could be made that states with
restrictive default provisions should adopt either the IRS' free transferability stance under the Proposed Rules or a simple majority stance from
Notice 95-10. Either approach will then increase the ease of gaining full
membership. In turn, this relatively liberal standard may mitigate some
of the potential problems resulting from an assignee's inability to manage
and to vote in an LLC.
A new default consent standard may decrease further the effects of
the assignee's lack of voting power. Ideally, free transferability could
solve the assignee's voting rights and management problem. This
possible solution is a further extension of Revenue Procedure 95-10's
majority requirement, which also permits up to seventy-nine percent of
an LLC's interests to be freely transferred without violating the nontransferability prong.19' Additionally, full membership rights upon
transfer will also be consistent with the layperson's expectations.'92
In order to retain the non-transferability element under current law
(Scenario 2), states may alter their present transfer requirements before
an assignor is permitted to assign her full interest in an LLC to a non-

190. Id. § 5.02(4), 1995-1 C.B. at 504.
191. Under present law, the LLC could potentially permit up to 79% of its interests to be fully
transferred or substituted while simultaneously retaining the non-transferability prong of the Resemblance Test. See Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(l), (2), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504 (noting that whenever 20%
or more of all the interests cannot confer full membership rights on an assignee, the LLC will lack
free transferability of interests). Therefore, the Notice actually permits much greater transferability
of interests than the facial majority rule. See Stack, supra note 95, at 51.
[Revenue Procedure 95-10] provides that the corporate characteristic of free transferability
will be lacking if more than 20% of the interests are restricted. Stated somewhat
differently, 79% of the interests can be freely transferable and this characteristic will be
lacking. Thus, if the LLC wishes to allow members of the LLC the right to assign their
interest and substitute an assignee in their place, this right can be given to the members
holding 79% of the interests held by all members.
Id.
192. See supra part I.
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member. For instance, states with inflexible statutes may reverse their
current position regarding the admission of an assignee into full membership. Under the present system, the assignee's membership status depends
upon receiving sufficient consent from the remaining members. In the
new scenario, before an assignee could become a full member empowered with both voting and membership rights, a majority193 of the
remaining members in interest of the LLC, excluding the assignor,
generally must consent to the assignor's proposed assignment to this
individual assignee. This reversal could work well whenever there is
hostility between the assignor and the remaining members. In such a
situation, the remaining members would probably support the assignor's
request for an assignment of interest. Such a reversal switches the nontransferability burden from the assignee to the member. In doing so, this
new requirement may satisfy the non-transferability prong for federal
income tax purposes,'94 while simultaneously granting the direct
transfer of voting rights from the assignor to the formerly non-member
assignee, who would then become a full member, because she will have
the right to vote and to manage the LLC. This reversal also implies that
the remaining members' approval of the assignment also inherently
ratifies the new member's legitimacy and standing to manage and to
work within the LLC. Admittedly, this would be a complete reversal of
the IRS stance under Revenue Procedure 95-10, which only permits the
non-member assignee to receive her voting and management rights if a
majority of the members vote to approve this grant of power. That is, the
assignor could transfer her rights to share in monetary gains and losses
without effectively depriving the assignee the power to vote and to
manage, which then enables the assignee to protect her interest and
investment in the LLC.
B. Possible Planning: Crafting Limited Liability
Companies to Maximize Protection of the
Non-Member Assignee Under CurrentLaw
Perusal of the four individual elements of the Resemblance Test
under Scenario 2 leads the practitioner to conclude that the LLC can only

193. See generallysupra part V.D.2 (discussing Notice 95-10's flexible definition of majority).
194. See generally supra part V (discussing four-part Resemblance Test used to determine the
tax status of a business entity).
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select one of the remaining three elements, because it is virtually'9 5
established by definition that the LLC will retain the corporate characteristic of limited liability.'96 Of the three remaining elements, centralized
management is probably the most desirable.19 7 In light of the managerial problems and liability ramifications which arise from the diffusion of
management power analyzed under the agency and respondeat superior
theories of ordinary partnerships, a middle-sized or large LLC could
benefit vastly by retaining the corporate trait of centralized management."'8 Thus, the LLC will generally have neither continuity of life

nor free transferability of interests under state law in order to preserve
the beneficial partnership tax classification under Scenario 2.'9 Some
states permit the nascent LLC the freedom to select from any one of the
remaining corporate characteristics.2 ° Selection of a "favorite" corpo-

195. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 609(b).
[All or specified members of a limited liability company may be liable in their capacity
as members for all or specified debts, obligations or liabilities of a limited liability
company if (1) a statement to such effect is specifically contained in the articles of
organization of the limited liability company and (2) any such member so liable shall
have (i) specifically consented in writing (A) to the adoption of such provisions or (B)
to be bound by such provision or (ii) specifically voted for the adoption of such
provision.
Id.
196. See Schmalz & Starr, supra note 29, at 261-62.
In sum, except for those LLCs whose members have waived liability protection,
an LLC seeking partnership classification [for federal income tax purposes] will start out
with one classification strike against it in that it will [already] possess limited liability .... Thus, for the LLC to be taxed as a partnership, the entity must lack at least two
of the remaining three corporate characteristics: centralized management, continuity of
life, and free transferability of interests.
Id.
197. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1993).
The effective operation of a business organization composed of many members generally
depends upon the centralization in the hands of a few of exclusive authority to make
management decisions for the organization, and therefore, centralized management is
more likely to be found in such [a larger] organization than in a smaller organization.
Id.
198. Macey, supra note 97, at 437 n.21 ("[Alny firm of significant size will have centralized
management.').
199. Miller, supra note 3, at 24 n.3 ("Most limited liability company acts are drafted so that a
limited liability company will fail the corporate classification test by lacking continuity of life and
free transferability of interests." (citation omitted); see Macey, supra note 97, at 435. ("[T]he Internal
Revenue Service has clearly stated that it will grant partnership (i.e., pass-through) tax status to
limited liability companies as long as they do not possess the corporate characteristics of continuity
of life and free transferability of interests." (citing Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361)).
200. See Geu, supra note 98, at 502 ("[U]nder some state statutes there may be room for
choosing which of the two [remaining] corporate characteristics to 'fail."').
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rate characteristic will depend on the individual LLC's goals, policies
underpinning the operating agreement, and possibly the members' or
managements' goals. On the other hand, the less flexible LLC acts are
"bulletproof'2 1 in the sense that the state legislature has predetermined
which corporate characteristics the LLC will retain from the Resemblance
Test, thereby precluding any freedom of choice for the businessperson
who is filing with the state that has a bulletproof statute. 20 2 As discussed below, the promoter may avoid a bulletproof statute by filing her
LLC documents with a state that offers a more flexible, and therefore
more favorable, LLC statute.20 3
Despite offering many benefits, 2' 4 a member's 205 interest in an

LLC is essentially non-transferable under current state law.2' This

characteristic must be retained in most states before the entity will be
classified as an LLC.
On the other hand, one can construct a flexible LLC which partially
mitigates both the problems and the deleterious effects associated with
the inflexibility that accompanies the non-transferability of a member's

interese

7 found

in most LLC statutes. Before filing with the secretary of

201. "Bulletproof' statutes are designed to "assure pass-through tax treatment... [while nonbulletproof statutes] allow[] for a great deal of flexibility in organization.... [This] allows LLC
members to respond to IRS changes." Spainhour, supra note 36, 34-35 (footnote omitted).
Bulletproof statutes "leave little room for practitioner error." McLaughlin, supra note 119, at 235
n.35.
202. Michigan's LLC statute is a unique "quasi-bulletproof' statute. In addition to requiring
LLCs to possess the limited liability element, "the Michigan Act forces taxpayers into lacking at
least two of the three other factors, thus guaranteeing partnership tax treatment, while providing
somewhat more flexibility than a strict bulletproof jurisdiction." Sider, supra note 70, at 1035; see
MICH. CoN. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4506(2), .4801(d)(ii) (West Supp. 1995).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 221, 222 and 226.
204. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
205. A member ofan LLC is analogous to a corporation's shareholder, or a limited partnership's
limited partner, in that each of these investors may be protected from personal liability. See supra
part V.C. On the other hand, a member in an LLC may have direct managerial powers. In order to
retain their limited liability, limited partners are denied managerial powers. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text (providing further discussion regarding limited partners' lack of managerial powers). Therefore, the LLC member retains the beneficial voting and management rights while retaining
the protections offered by limited liability. This result is the next step along the business entity
evolutionary continuum. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. For a brief historical discussion
of the LLC in context of past business entities, see supra part II.
206. See supra note 9 (listing various default consent requirements that govern transfer of full
membership interests in LLC statutes).
207. Because LLCs tend to be small businesses, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, LLCs
may have a relatively difficult time raising capital to finance projects or any other necessary
undertaking. Therefore, an organizer may wish to increase the ease of transferability of a member's
interest to a non-member in order to create a potential tool for the LLC to use as an alternative
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state or department of state to create an LLC,2 08 the LLC organizer

must define clearly the LLC's goals, which, more likely than not, will
then be reflected in the operating agreement. 2 In defining the purpose

of the LLC, one factor that the organizer will consider is the importance
of whether or not the LLC should maximize flexibility in terms of
transferring member interests2 10 from a member assignor to a nonmember assignee. Selecting relatively free transferability of membership
interests might provide a starting point of issues and solutions to examine
this goal while
which may aid practitioners and their clients in achieving
2
simultaneously protecting the non-member assignee. '
method of raising additional capital. For a parallel of this concept which exists in the limited
partnership context, see Geu, supra note 32, at 82-83 ("The relative ease of admitting new limited
partners is important for the business planner to consider when choosing an entity because it gives
the limited partnership a more practical equity alternative to debt for future financing."). Thus,
another incidental benefit that such a model LLC might offer through easing the transfer of voting
and management rights to an assignee may be the creation of a more beneficial method of raising
capital for the LLC by facilitating the entry of new members.
Although some organizers may prefer restricted transferability in a small business, the
organizer may still increase the initial flexibility of transferring membership interests to prepare
against future contingencies. The main caveat is that while the organizer may want to maximize the
individual member's power to transfer her interests, this flexibility must be tempered in order to
preserve the LLC's beneficial tax status under Scenario 2. She must carefully weigh and balance
these two factors to insure retaining the partnership characteristic of non-transferability for federal
income tax purposes. Because greater flexibility could improve the planner's options in light of
future problems, states should adopt either the more liberal approach found in the Proposed Rules,
or in Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(1), (2), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504. For further discussion regarding entity
classification for federal income tax purposes under Scenario 2, see supra part V.
208. LLCs are statutory creatures that are created by filing articles of organization with the
department of state or secretary of state. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-123 (West Supp.
1995) ("A limited liability company is formed when the articles of organization are delivered to the
secretary of state for filing and endorsed by the secretary of state .... ."); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW
§ 203(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996) ("A limited liability company is formed at the time of the filing
of the initial articles of organization with the department of state. ..!).
209. In most states, the operating agreement is a document which governs virtually all aspects
of a limited liability company. The operating agreement "relat[es] to (i) the business of the limited
liability company, (ii) the conduct of its affairs and (iii) the rights, powers, preferences, limitations
or responsibilities of its members, managers, employees or agents, as the case may be." N.Y. LTD.
LIAB. Co. LAW § 417 (McKinney 1995).
This plan is similar to a corporation's by-laws or a limited partnership's limited partnership
agreement. See Miller, supra note 3, at 25-26 ("An operating or management agreement governs
business operations and relationships among members of a limited liability company."). See also
Geu, supra note 32, at 62 (noting that a partnership agreement in a limited partnership is analogous
to the by-laws in a corporation).
210. For a definition of "full" membership interest see supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
See generally supra part V.D (discussing transferability of interests in LLCs under Scenario 2).
211. Some states offer greater flexibility than others regarding transferability. See supra text
accompanying notes 195-203 (contrasting bulletproof and flexible LLC statutes). By understanding
the variations between the states' LLC acts, the practitioner may shop between states in order to best
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The current Resemblance Test presents complex and unnecessary
planning problems. While increasing the ability to transfer member
interests to assignees, a practitioner must carefully craft the LLC to retain
sufficient factors"' to maintain the essential non-transferability characteristic of partnerships for federal income tax purposes.1 3 If the new
LLC is classified 2 4 by the IRS as an association which possesses the
corporate characteristic of free transferability, the entity will be both
penalized severely 2 5 and treated as a corporation for federal income
tax purposes,216 which could217effectively frustrate one of the initial goals
in the creation of the LLC.
Additional factors affect the freedom of transfer from a member
assignor to a non-member assignee. Understanding these factors helps us
to build a paradigm for LLCs that mitigates the harshness of nontransferability for the non-member assignee under present state laws that
deny flexible transfers. 1 8

An important initial distinction is differentiating between flexible
serve the promoter's interests. See infra notes 221, 222 and 226.
212. Upon finalization of the Proposed Rules, the entity classification function of the Resemblance Test will become moot because the Proposed Rules would permit taxpayers to default into
a partnership classification for federal income tax purposes where the entity is eligible. See supra
notes 63 and 95. Adoption of the Proposed Rules will not eliminate the transferability quandary that
presently exists due to the states' non-transferability stance. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
213. See discussion supra part V.A-D.
214. Again, this scenario assumes that the Proposed Rules have not yet been finalized.
215. See LEFKONTZ & AKSELRAD, supra note 14, § 1.4.2.
If an LLC fails to qualify for partnership status under federal tax law, all of the
LLC's income will be taxable twice [as if it were a corporation] ....
In addition, the LLC will have operated without filing corporate income tax
returns and without paying corporate income tax.... [Under the Internal Revenue Code,]
substantial penalties may be imposed for late filing of corporate returns, underreporting
of taxes, and underpayment of taxes.
Accordingly, care must be taken in strncturing the LLC to assure that it is
classified as a partnership for income tax purposes.
Id.
216. See generally suprapart V (discussing four-part Resemblance Test used to determine the
tax status of a business entity).
217. This scenario assumes that the LLC planner relied on a partnership classification of the
non-transferability prong. For example, an LLC which initially elected the corporate characteristics
of limited liability and centralized management would be classified as a partnership if the LLC
possessed no other corporate characteristics. If the planner inadvertently caused the LLC to possess
free transferability in addition to the two previous characteristics, then the LLC would be treated as
a corporation for federal income tax purposes. Such a result would penalize the LLC. See supra note
215.
218. See supra note 9 (describing consent requirements of default provisions of various LLC
statutes).
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and bulletproof statutes. In general, if the statute is flexible and not

"bulletproof,"2 9 the state may favor both greater latitude and discretion
for the LLC and the membership.' As a corollary, the organizer also
has the freedom to shop2 2 for the most favorable LLC statute and then

file the LLC's documents with a state that provides the most flexibility
in transferring interestsm for members of an LLC.2z On the other

219. Most LLC acts permit the LLC to opt out of the default solutions offered by the state LLC
statute. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 202 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (permitting a New York
LLC to adopt articles of organization which displace the default provisions provided by the state
LLC statute). See supranote 201. In such flexible states, members of the LLC have the opportunity
to contract privately to abide by terms which have been specially tailored in the operating agreement,
instead of being governed by the default provisions of the state's LLC act. As a result, some potential pitfalls may arise.
Because of the dichotomies which will arise between the state's default requirements and
provisions within the private operating agreement, the LLC planner is presented with a potential
opportunity to exploit in order to increase flexibility of transferring her membership interest to nonmember assignees. On the other hand, the planner also may be ambushed by problems of
interpretation. If a state requires unanimous consent by the remaining members before an assignee
can become fully enfranchised as a member with management rights, an LLC's lack of free
transferability classification may be jeopardized by an operating agreement which lowers the consent
threshold to a simple majority. At the moment, the law in this area is very murky. Although both
the Proposed Rules and Revenue Procedure 95-10 may provide LLC members with some persuasive
support for the liberalization of the voting requirement, see Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(1), (2), 1995-1
C.B. 501, 504, state law nonetheless would prevail.
One possible solution to this problem may be to require consent that exceeds a simple
majority. A supermajority approaching two-thirds or even three-quarters of the remaining members
may circumvent the unanimity requirement in some states. As the voting threshold requirement
approaches unanimity in the operating agreement, the chances increase of satisfying inflexible default
provisions of state LLC statutes that require unanimity. Additionally, this increased consent
requirement also reflects the problems created by the Resemblance Test. Thus, an LLC may be able
to increase transferability of member interests to a lesser degree by availing itself of the opportunity
to contract out of the state's default statutory provisions regarding non-transferability. Although this
results in less flexibility than offered by Revenue Procedure 95-10, see id., the planner who files in
a state that requires unanimous consent must otherwise abide by the state's inflexible transfer provision.
220. States provide that an LLC may opt out of the default provision requiring unanimous
consent. See, e.g., CAL.CORP. CODE § 17303(a) (West Supp. 1995) ("Except as otherwiseprovided
in the articles of organization or the operating agreement, an assignee of an interest in a limited
liability company may become a member only if the other members unanimously vote in favor of
the assignee's admission .... (emphasis added)). But see supra note 201 and accompanying text
(noting that bulletproof statutes allow for less flexibility in structuring the LLC).
221. "[J]urisdictional competition for limited liability company charters, similar to the
competition for general corporate charters that Delaware currently leads, could develop as states vie
with each other for the chartering fees associated with the formation of limited liability companies."
Macey, supra note 97, at 441; see infra notes 222 and 226.
222. See Sider, supra note 70, at 1035 (discussing how the enactment of a bulletproof statute,
while achieving the desired goal of ensuring tax classification of LLCs as a partnership, may force
LLC organizers to shop for out-of-state, non-bulletproof statutes where flexibility in the ability to
transfer interests is desired). See generally Macey, supra note 97, at 447 (discussing the role of
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statute may indicate a state's aversion to LLC
hand, a "bulletproof'
4
flexibility.22
Before selecting which state to file in the creation of an LLC, the
promoter may be able to increase the ease of transferring a member's
interest by understanding the differences between in-state and out-of-state
LLC statutes. By knowing the advantages and the weaknesses of each
statute, the practitioner may carefully select the state's LLC law which
is most favorable to her client's goals. For example, if the client prefers
flexibility of transfer, the attorney would avoid bulletproof statutes.225
In effect, the different degrees of flexibility among the statutes fosters
LLC statutory forum shopping. 2 6
A third factor that affects freedom of transferability is reflected by
the standard of care that may exist between LLC members and their
management.227 By adopting a higher standard of due care between
members and management within an LLC, the operating agreement may
provide greater protection for the LLC member. This concept may be
expanded to apply to non-member assignees as well. If the statute that
governs the LLC does not already define the standard of care among the
members, the operating agreement of a model LLC may specifically

competitive pressures amongst states for chartering revenues in the enactment of increasingly
hospitable LLC statutes); see also infra note 226.
223. See supra part V.D.
224. See generally supra note 9 (listing LLC statutes and their voting requirements).
225. See supranote 201 and accompanying text (discussing how the bulletproof statutes ensure
beneficial tax classification while flexible statutes may permit greater free transferability of LLC
interests).
226. See Macey, supra note 97, at 447.
[T]he very existence of limited liability companies supports the hypothesis that there is
vigorous competition among states for chartering revenues, and that most states (not only
Delaware) are responsive to competitive pressures. Moreover, it is significant that states
feel this ... pressure in the limited liability company context even though no state is
likely to become as dominant in this market as Delaware has become in the competition
for the charters of traditional corporations.
Id.; see also supra notes 221-22.
227. See Miller, supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that the standard of conduct concepts from agency,
partnership and contractual principles should apply between members and managers in LLCs in order
to protect "historically abused minority and passive owners"). Professor Miller argues that the higher
standard of due care prescribed by agency law should govem relationships between members and
management. Id. at 74, 82-83. "A standard of due care applicable to all members would foster the
reciprocal responsibility owed by majority and minority members toward each other." Id. at 75.
Agency law's standard of due care, or negligence standard, between members and managers is a
"more socially responsible legal standard of care [than is the partnership standard of gross negligence]." Id. at 78. This higher standard of care may counteract the tendency of LLC members to act
more carelessly or recklessly, which results from the lack of personal liability offered by an LLC.
Id. at 77.
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extend the due care protection in such a manner 28 that members and
managers would owe the same fiduciary duty to the non-member
assignee as the members and managers would normally owe to each
other. Thus, the operating agreement may be drafted to protect the
presently voiceless non-member assignee. This is another possible shield
which decreases the damage that the non-transferability of voting rights
inadvertently creates for the non-member assignee in an LLC that is a
small business.
Along the same fiduciary duty vein, an operating agreement in a
flexible LLC may include a provision which would not permit a member
to act in any way that violates her duty of loyalty to any of her fellow
members and non-members. As a result of such an agreement, the
member may be prohibited from acting in ways that may injure the nonmember assignee.229
A fourth opportunity that exists for the planner to increase free
transferability is inherent in the selection of a management structure for
the LLC. Because Revenue Procedure 95-10 permits consent from a
simple majority of member-managers in a centrally-managed LLC, the
Revenue Procedure greatly increases the LLC's free transferability, while
simultaneously preserving this prong for federal income tax purposes
under Scenario 2.23 o Instead of requiring majority consent from the
membership, the assignee only needs a majority vote of approval from
the member-managers. The planner must keep in mind that this IRS

228. The protective thrust that underpins the fiduciary duty concept was eloquently set forth by
Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that
is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating
erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered
by any judgment of this court.
Id. (citation omitted).
229. For example, if a hostile outsider has explicitly stated that she would like to buy a
controlling interest in an LLC in order to achieve a goal which may be detrimental to either the
membership or the non-member assignee, the contractual protection offered by the operating
agreement in this case may cover both the member and the non-member assignees. Therefore, the
majority in interest member may not be able to transfer her interest to the hostile "vulture" due to
the contractual fiduciary obligations imposed by the operating agreement.
230. See supra part V.D.2 (discussing the free transferability prong after the changes as
announced in Revenue Procedure 95-10).
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position on majority consent may conflict with an in-state unanimity
requirement. Therefore, the planner may have sufficient incentive to shop
for a more favorable LLC statute.2 31
In summary, choice of state law may increase transferability of
interests, 23 2 thereby possibly further shielding the non-member assignee.
Additionally, an operating agreement may be crafted to avoid the default
legal "settings" provided by the in-state LLC statute by opting out of the
state's requirements and agreeing to be governed solely by the private
contractual terms of the operating agreement.2 33 Examining and understanding the fiduciary obligations and relationships that exist in close
corporations may lead to drafting an operating agreement in a flexible
LLC that protects non-member assignees by selecting a due care
standard. Finally, selection of a centrally-managed LLC may increase
free transferability because of Revenue Procedure 95-10's lower majority
consent threshold. Therefore, an attorney may carefully weigh and
balance each of the above competing elements in light of the flexible
LLC's goal of maximizing transferability, while simultaneously retaining
the required partnership characteristic of non-transferability2 34 and
protecting the non-member assignee during the planning stage of a future
LLC.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In summary, several themes, or currents, flow in support of the
conclusion that states with inflexible transfer default provisions235
should amend their LLC statutes in a manner which facilitates 236 the
transfer of a full membership interest to an assignee. As a result, state
law will then meet and conform with the small businessperson's
reasonable expectation that she will be2able
to protect her investment and
37
actively manage and vote in the LLC.
In addition to satisfying the assignees' goals and expectations, such
an easing of state default provisions will also be consistent with the
federal government's trend towards facilitating transfers to assignees.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See supra notes 221, 222 and 226.
See supra text accompanying notes 221, 222 and 226.
See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
See supra part V.D.
See supra note 9.
See generally supra part VI.A (suggesting revision of default provisions of state LLC

statutes).
237. See supra part I.
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Initially, the IRS' transfer standard basically prevented the full transfer
of membership interests by requiring unanimous consent from the
remaining LLC members.23 State laws then followed suit. Afterwards,
this strict standard was lowered by Revenue Procedure 95-10.239 Not
only did 95-10 permit a majority vote from an LLC's members to be
sufficient, but this Revenue Procedure also permitted a majority vote of
managers to be sufficient to bestow full membership powers upon the
assignee." Additionally, if a planner chose, she could elect to permit
the LLC to have free transferability approaching seventy-nine percent of
an LLC's interests.241 In effect, the Proposed Rules have lifted the
twenty-one percent restriction as imposed by Revenue Procedure 9510.242

Although the preceding chronology reflects how transferability has
metamorphosed for federal income tax purposes, the states that currently
retain the unanimity requirement 43 are clearly behind the current curve,
or trend that facilitates transfers of membership interests.
By juxtaposing an assignee of LLC interests in a small business
with a minority shareholder of close corporations, it becomes apparent
that an assignee will experience similar difficulties that her counterpart
2
will encounter in protecting her investment in the small business. "
Therefore, easing state default transfer provisions of LLC statutes will
mitigate the problems that these assignees in small businesses presently
confront.
Finally, comparisons between the Proposed Rules (Scenario 1)245
and the Resemblance Test (Scenario 2)246 serve to highlight the
difficulties created by the latter approach. In addition to easing transferability, the Proposed Rules also protect the small businessperson's
reasonable expectations of active involvement with the small business.
States that currently require unanimous consent before an assignee

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra notes 8, 68-69, 199 and accompanying text.
Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501.
See supra part V.D.2.a.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 9.

244.

See supra part III.

245. See supra part IV.
246. See supra part V.
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gains a full membership interest in an LLC should either lower or
eliminate this outmoded prerequisite.
Victor Tai Wung Chiu*

* The author would like to express his warmest thanks to Howard N. Lefkowitz, Esq.,
member of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, New York, NY; Chair, Committee on
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Professor Cheryl L. Wade, Professor Robert D. Ellis, and Professor Mitchell Gans, Hofstra
University School of Law and Genevieve P. Cannon, Esq., Rogers & Wells, each provided
invaluable support and insights to this Note.
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